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Changes  in  the  Food,  Conservation,  and  Energy  Act 
of 2008 have the potential to push domestic support for 
United States farmers above current and proposed commit-
ments in the WTO. This article explores one of the inevi-
table questions that arise with the enactment of the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 regarding how the 
domestic agricultural support provisions in this legislation 
will affect United States commitments under the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). And further, 
how will the domestic supports fit with the proposals and 
negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda?
Much of the discussion going into the development of 
the 2008 Act identified four main pressures that would bear 
on its development, namely: federal budget issues, chang-
ing demographics, evolving structure of interest groups, 
and implications for WTO agreements and dispute panel 
findings (Mercier and Smith, 2006).
In the end, with the enactment of the Food, Conserva-
tion and Energy Act (FCEA) of 2008 on May 2, 2008 it 
appears that at least the first three pressures did generate re-
forms in the 2008 Act compared to the previous Farm Se-
curity and Rural Investment Act of 2002. This is reflected 
in new titles such as Horticulture and Organic Agriculture, 
Livestock, Commodity Futures, and Crop Insurance and 
Disaster Assistance. The act also provides reforms in pay-
ment eligibility and limits. However, with respect to do-
mestic farm support, nearly all of the basic farm safety net 
that accounts for the notification by the United States on 
domestic support commitments with the WTO remains 
intact, including price supports for dairy and sugar, loan 
deficiency payments, direct payments and counter-cyclical 
payments. Changes in the dairy support program include 
shifting support to product prices rather than the milk 
price. This will affect how the program is notified under 
the U.S. Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), although 
it will not greatly affect program operation. The 2008 Act 
provides few reforms that address in any substantive way 
U.S. obligations under the WTO. In fact it may be argued 
that the 2008 farm bill potentially creates more payment 
exposure to meeting WTO obligations than its predeces-
sor. 
U.S. Commitments on Domestic Support under the 
Agreement on Agriculture
The United States and some thirty other countries agreed 
in  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Agriculture  to  a 
scheduled reduction of trade-distorting domestic support. 
As part of this agreement, the members agreed to notify 
the WTO annually regarding the payments made under 
several  categories  of  domestic  support,  including  Green 
Box (minimally trade-distorting), Blue Box (trade-distort-
ing but subject to supply control) and Amber Box (trade 
distorting). Amber Box includes the Aggregate Measure 
of Support (AMS) which is subject to the scheduled re-
duction, and the de minimus support that is not. Both the 
AMS and de minimus payments are further divided into 
non-product specific and product specific. (Under the de 
minimus provision if product specific or the non-product 
specific payment totals are not larger than 5% of their re-
spective total market value of production, then the support 
does not have to be included in the total AMS.)
At the end of the scheduled reduction period of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 2000, the 
annual spending constraint on U.S. AMS was U.S. $19.1 
billion. It will remain at this level until a new agreement 
is negotiated and ratified by member nations. Domestic 
support  payments  subject  to  constraints  are  monitored 
and implemented by the Agriculture Committee of the 
WTO. “Notifications” of support payments are submitted 
by members. Notifications however have been slow. Only 
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of  domestic  support  commitments 
for the marketing years 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2005, as shown in Table 1. 
(WTO document G/AG/N/USA/60 
of 9 October 2007)
Programs that count toward the 
U.S.  AMS  commitment  based  on 
current  U.S.  notification  include: 
loan deficiency payments, marketing 
loan gains, other product specific sup-
port including storage payments and 
commodity  loan  interest  subsidies, 
market price supports for dairy and 
sugar, and non-product specific sup-
ports including irrigation programs, 
grazing  programs  and  federal  crop 
insurance (indemnities less premiums 
paid notified as non-product-specific 
amber box de minimus). ( See CRS 
Report RS20840, Agriculture in the 
WTO: Limits on Domestic Support, 
by Randy Schnepf, listed in For More 
Information section )
Key Changes in the 2008 Act 
Likely to Affect AMS Notification
Minor changes are authorized in the 
2008 Act for the marketing loan pro-
gram,  direct  payment  program  and 
the price-based counter-cyclical pro-
gram  The  direct  payment  program 
(notified by the U.S. as Green Box) 
and the counter-cyclical program (no-
tified as non-product-specific Amber 
Box de minimus) are mentioned here 
because in the recent Brazilian cotton 
dispute panel finding and appeal. The 
panel found that U.S. payments under 
the  Production  Flexibility  Contract 
and Direct Payment programs do not 
qualify for WTO’s Green Box catego-
ry of domestic spending because of 
their prohibition on planting fruits, 
vegetables, and wild rice on covered 
program acreage. While the counter-
cyclical program was not considered 
in the dispute, it also is subject to pro-
hibition on planting specialty crops. 
Even though in the Doha July 2004 
Framework,  the  U.S.  succeeded  in 
obtaining agreement on counter-cy-
clical payments as Blue Box, without 
a Doha Round agreement, this Blue 
Box notification would be also likely 
subject to dispute. See Mercier (2004) 
and Schnepf (2007) for information 
on the Brazilian dispute. More signif-
icant is the introduction of the Aver-
age Revenue Crop Election (ACRE) 
program. This program is offered to 
program  commodity  producers  as 
an alternative to the counter-cyclical 
payment (CCP) program beginning 
in 2009.
The  CCP  program,  enacted  as 
part of the 2002 farm bill, is triggered 
by low commodity prices relative to 
fixed  target  prices;  ACRE  provides 
a  risk  management  tool  to  address 
either  or  both  low  yields  and  low 
prices. Two triggers must be met be-
fore an ACRE payment occurs. First, 
state-level  ACRE  guarantee  revenue 
per acre must exceed the actual state 
revenue per acre and second, the farm 
ACRE  benchmark  revenue  per  acre 
must exceed the actual farm revenue 
per acre. The state ACRE guarantee 
is  the  5-year  Olympic  average  state 
yield  times  the  average  of  the  past 
two years’ national price times 90% 
for  the  specified  crop.  The  actual 
state revenue will be the state yield 
per  planted  acre  times  the  national 
average market price or 70% of the 
national loan rate. The farm ACRE 
benchmark is the farm’s 5-year Olym-
pic yield per planted acre times the 
average of the past two years’ national 
price plus the per acre insurance pre-
mium on the crop. The state ACRE 
guarantee  revenue  cannot  increase 
or  decrease  more  than  10%  during 
2010-2012 from the previous year’s 
state ACRE guarantee revenue level. 
Because the payments are triggered or 
coupled to current production, mar-
ket prices and yields, payments under 
this  program  will  likely  be  Amber 
Box and count against the AMS con-
straint. See the accompanying article 
by Zulauf, Dicks and Vitale in this 
issue for more details on the ACRE 
program.
The commodity title also increases 
the loan rate for sugar a quarter cent 
per year for 3 years and changes the 
overall allotment quota to be a mini-
mum of 85% of domestic consump-
tion. The Act extends the Milk In-
come  Loss  Contract  program  until 
2012, increases the payment rate and 
eligible poundage and provides price 
supports for cheddar cheese, butter, 
and nonfat dry milk.
Notification of 2008 Payments 
Under Existing Commitments
Projections  of  market  prices  for 
most program crops supported by the 
2008 Act will imply that the notifi-
cation values on loan deficiency pay-
ments and marketing loan gains will 
help keep AMS product specific pay-
ment levels well below $19.1 billion. 
(See  USDA  Long-Term  Projections 
to 2017 at http://www.usda.gov/oce/
commodity/ag_baseline.htm and FA-
PRI 2008 U.S. and World Agricul-
tural Outlook at http://www.fapri.ia-
state.edu/outlook2008/) The primary 
concern will focus on the payments 
that are likely to flow from expected 
high participation on the ACRE pro-
gram  by  corn,  wheat  and  soybean 
producers. This program will not go 
Table 1. U .S . Notification of Domestic Agricultural Support Payments to the WTO
ITEM
2002 2003 200 200
U.S. $ Billion
Amber Box $9. $.9 $11. $12.9
Amber Box Limit (WTO Ceiling) $19.1 $19.1 $19.1 $19.1
Green Box – No Limit $8.3 $.1 $. $1.8
Source: USDA, News Release No. 0278.07, October 4, 2007.8  CHOICES  3rd Quarter 2008 • 23(3) 
into effect until the 2009 marketing 
year  but  exceptionally  high  market 
prices in 2007 and 2008 provide the 
potential  for  large  payments  in  the 
2009  and  possibly  2010  marketing 
years should market prices decline. 
Potential for Changes in WTO 
AMS Commitments
A successful conclusion to the Doha 
Round  negotiations  remains  elusive 
as reflected by the July 2008 mini-
ministerial collapse. The U.S. offered 
to reduce overall trade distorting sup-
port (Blue Box + Amber Box + non-
product-specific de minimus + prod-
uct-specific de minimus limits) from 
$48 billion to $15 billion contingent 
on matching market access offers by 
other WTO member nations. It also 
agreed  under  the  same  contingency 
to  reduce  the  AMS  trade-distorting 
commitment of $19.1 billion down to 
$7.64 billion. Again, with sustained 
high crop prices, market price sup-
ports for sugar and milk will account 
for most of the payments against this 
proposed new limit. However, as sug-
gested above, the potential payment 
exposure  from  the  ACRE  program 
could easily strain the ability of the 
U.S. to remain below the proposed 
$7.64 billion limit. Not until and un-
less a new round is completed will this 
become  a  real  concern.  Even  then, 
how the U.S. Congress may address 
the potential of exceeding the AMS 
remains unclear.
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